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DISABILITY ADVOCACY- AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
THE ROAD FROM PENRYTO ATKINS
JAMES W. ELLIS*
The Supreme Court's decision inAtkins v. Virginia,' holding that individuals with
mental retardation are not eligible for the death penalty, has many implications, a
number of which are explored in articles in this Symposium.2 This article will focus
on Atkins as an example of the Court's methodology in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment, with its unique juxtaposition of legislative action and constitutional
text. It will also explore the relationship of advocacy interests, in this case
professional and voluntary organizations in the disability community, with both
legislatures and the Court.3
I. MENTAL RETARDATION AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
THE CHRONOLOGY
The possibility that individuals with mental retardation might face capital
punishment came into the nation's consciousness relatively recently, and thus the
history of this issue is relatively brief. The first case that received national attention
was the proposed execution of Jerome Bowden, an individual who had mental
retardation, in Georgia in 1986. As a result of protests against the prospect that a
person with mental retardation might be executed, the state Board of Pardons and
Paroles granted a stay of execution to permit a clinical evaluation. That evaluation
revealed Bowden to be a person with mental retardation, but despite this finding, the
Board lifted the stay of execution, and he was executed the next day.4
The popular revulsion at this spectacle in the State of Georgia moved the state
legislature to enact the nation's first statute prohibiting the execution of defendants
with mental retardation. 5 Less noticed, but at least equally significant, was the
awakening of the disability community to the possibility that individuals with
mental retardation might be subject to the death penalty. The American Association
on Mental Retardation (AAMR), the largest professional organization in the field,
adopted a resolution opposing such executions in January 1988.6 Within months,
similar resolutions had been endorsed by the Association for Retarded Citizens
(since renamed the Arc) and the American Bar Association.

* Regents Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. Professor Ellis was Counsel of
Record for the American Association on Mental Retardation and other disability organizations as amici curiae in
Penry v. Lynaugh andMcCarver v.North Carolina and argued for Petitioner in Atkins v. Virginia. The author would
like to express deep appreciation to the colleagues at UNM School of Law who served as co-counsel in McCarver,
Professors Michael Browde, Chris Fritz, and April Land, as well as to the law students who served on the team that
worked on the briefs in McCarver and Atkins.
1. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2. Beyond Atkins: A Symposium on the Implications ofAtkins v. Virginia, 33 N.M. L. REV. 173 (2003).
3. This article will not address implementation issues left open by the Court's opinion in Atkins, such as
the definition of mental retardation and the procedures for adjudicating individual cases. Those issues are explored
in James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 11 (2003).

4. See Jim Galloway & Tracy Thompson, Bowden Executed Day after "Mildly Retarded" Ruling, ATLANTA
CONST., June 25, 1986, at Al.

5. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (Supp. 1988).
6. Brief of Amici Curiae American Association on Mental Retardation et al. at 19, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 302 (1989) (No. 87-6177) [hereinafter AAMR Brief for Penry].
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It was at this juncture that the U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue. The
Court granted certiorari in Penry v. Lynaugh 7 on the question whether "it [is] cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to execute a mentally
retarded person." 8 The Court was presented with three principal arguments on the
Eighth Amendment issue: (1) the execution of people with mental retardation had
been prohibited at common law; (2) the culpability of defendants with mental
retardation was disproportionate to the penalty of death; and (3) a national
consensus opposed the execution of people with mental retardation.9 The Court
declined to find an Eighth Amendment violation based on the first two arguments,
although Justice O'Connor's opinion indicated that she viewed the culpability
argument as presenting a relatively close question.' ° The reason for rejecting the
consensus issue was of a different character.
The Court began by reviewing its past decisions that had invalidated capital
punishment laws because they violated a contemporary consensus of the American
people. " The opinion then notes that at the time of the Penry briefing and argument,
the evidence of the claimed consensus was limited to the resolutions of professional
organizations, a modest amount of political polling results, and enactments by the
Congress and the legislature of only one state (Georgia). 2 The Court found this to
be an inadequate demonstration of a national consensus.
The public sentiment expressed in these and other polls and resolutions may
ultimately find expression in legislation, which is an objective indicator of
contemporary values upon which we can rely. But at present, there is insufficient
evidence of a national consensus against executing mentally retarded people
convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categorically prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment. 3

Whether this passage was intended by the Court in 1989 as an indirect invitation to
return with another case presenting the issue if further evidence of a national

7. 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987) cert. granted, 487 U.S. 1233 (1988) (No. 87-6177).
8. Penry, 492 U.S. at 313. The Court also had before it the issue of whether the jury instructions in the
penalty phase of Penry's trial had been given adequate opportunity to evaluate the mitigating significance of the
defendant's mental retardation. The Court granted relief on this issue and remanded the case to the Texas courts for
resentencing or retrial. Id. at 328, 340.
9. See AAMR Brief for Penry, supra note 6, at 9, 13, 17-18.
10. Four Justices concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate for all defendants with mental
retardation. Penry, 492 U.S. at 343-44 (Brennan & Marshall, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at
350 (Stevens & Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor noted that mental
retardation has long been widely recognized as a factor mitigating against imposing the death penalty but was
unwilling to base categorical relief on the presence of the condition.
On the record before the Court today, however, I cannot conclude that all mentally retarded
people of Penry's ability-by virtue of their mental retardation alone, and apart from any
individualized consideration of their personal responsibility-inevitably lack the cognitive,
volitional, and moral capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death
penalty.
Id. at 338.
11. See discussion infra part III.
12. Between the date of-the argument and the issuance of the Court's opinion, the state of Maryland passed
a statute banning the execution of people with mental retardation. The printed version of the Court's opinion was
modified to include the Maryland statute.
13. Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
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consensus became available or not, some people in the disability community read
it that way. 4
In 1990, Kentucky and Tennessee became the first states to consider the issue of
mental retardation and the death penalty since the Court's decision in Penry, and
each enacted a prohibition on the practice. 5 A decade later, a total of thirteen states
had enacted statutes protecting individuals with mental retardation from the death
penalty. At that point, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in the case of
McCarverv. North Carolina,6 a direct appeal from the state supreme court, which
raised the question, "Does significant objective evidence demonstrate that national
standards have evolved such that executing [the] mentally retarded []would violate
[the] Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."' 7 The
briefs of Petitioner and supporting amici curiae were filed with the Court, but, prior
to the filing of Respondent's brief, the North Carolina legislature enacted a statute
preventing the execution of individuals with mental retardation. Upon learning of
the passage of this statute (with its explicit provision for retrospective relief for
individuals with mental retardation currently under death sentences), the Court
dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.' 8 Shortly thereafter, the Court granted
certiorari in another case presenting the same issue, Atkins v. Virginia,'9 which was
also on direct appeal. In the six months between the granting of the petition in
McCarverand the grant in Atkins, five more states (Florida, Connecticut, Missouri,
Arizona, and North Carolina) had enacted similar statutes.
On June 20, 2002, the Court issued its opinion in Atkins. A majority, consisting
of six Justices including Justices O'Connor and Kennedy who had rejected
a
categorical ban in Penry,2° held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution
of any individual with mental retardation.
Our independent evaluation of the issue reveals no reason to disagree with the
judgment of "the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter" and
concluded that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal. We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals
will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death
penalty. Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our
"evolving standards of decency," we therefore conclude
that such punishment

14. 1do not mean to suggest that influencing the Supreme Court was the principal
(or even a particularly
prominent) motivation for the advocacy efforts that followed in the states. In each
state that considered enacting
legislation over the next dozen years, the focus of the debate was on what the law
should be in that state, and, in
particular, whether people with mental retardation should be subject to that state's
death penalty.
15. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314 n. 12 (providing citations to the laws in each of the states).
16. 548 S.E.2d 522 (N.C. 2001), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727).
17. 532 U.S. 941 (2001).
18. McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001).
19. 533 U.S. 976 (2001). Upon a motion from the organizations and individuals who
had filed amicus curiae
briefs in McCarver, those briefs were accepted by the Court as if they had been
filed in support of Petitioner in
Atkins. Atkins v. Virginia, 534 U.S. 1053 (2001). Thus, when the Court refers to
amicus briefs in its opinion, its
reference is to briefs that were filed in McCarver. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316
n.21.
20. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy were joined by Justice Stevens, who had
dissented on the Eighth
Amendment issue in Penry, 492 U.S. at 349, and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
who had joined the Court
since 1989.
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is excessive and that the Constitution "places a substantive restriction on the
State's power to take the life" of a mentally retarded offender.2

The issue to be addressed is the analysis of what happened in the thirteen years
between Penry and Atkins that altered the Court's interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment.
II. STATE LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF DISABILITY ADVOCATES
Public sentiment on the issue of mental retardation and the death penalty
remained largely unchanged during the period between Penry and Atkins. As the
Penry opinion noted, the handful of public opinion surveys available in 1989 clearly
indicated that a substantial majority of Americans opposed executing defendants
with mental retardation.22 Over the next thirteen years, an abundance of additional
surveys were taken on the subject, both from national samplings and also from
individual states, and all produced similar results.23 But agreement by the public
with an abstract proposition of public policy does not automatically result in the
enactment of legislation. The translation of public sentiment into public laws
requires, above all, commitment of time and effort by advocates in the legislative
arena.
The disability community did not accept the Supreme Court's opinion in Penry
as the final word on the subject. Indeed, the publicity surrounding the Court case
raised the visibility of the issue to disability advocates at the state level. In state after
state, those advocates made death penalty bills a top priority for their legislative
efforts.24

These advocacy groups were already well known to legislators.25 On a wide array
of issues, progress for people with mental retardation has been initiated and
vigorously pursued by organizations composed largely of parents and other family
members of individuals with intellectual disabilities.26 These groups have dedicated
themselves to such measures as special education opportunities and community
alternatives to residential institutional placement. Foremost among these

21.
22.
23.
submitted
24.

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
492 U.S. at 334-35.
All of the publicly available polling results are collected in Appendix B to the AAMR amicus brief
in McCarver.
Not surprisingly, there was also considerable activity in the courts on the issue. See, e.g., Fleming v.

Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. 1989) (holding that the execution of defendants with mental retardation violated the State
Constitution); Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) (same). But the primary arena for consideration of
the issue was state legislatures.
25. Although many legislative efforts begin with a public relations campaign in order to mobilize public
opinion in support of a proposed bill, others proceed directly to the legislative arena. ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE THIRD

HOUSE: LOBBYISTS AND LOBBYING INTHE STATES 171-77 (2d ed. 2001). In no state was there a public relations
effort in advance of the legislature's consideration of this issue.
26. The success of the efforts of such advocates has been noted by the Supreme Court. See City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
27. See, e.g., Anne Farber & Kay Marcel, Parent Power: Change Through Grassroots Networking, in
CREATING INDIVIDUAL SUPPORTS FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 373 (Valerie J. Bradley et al.
eds., 1994); David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered. The Case of Special Education,
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at 63, 68-69; Frederick J. Weintraub & Alan R. Abeson, Appropriate
Educationfor All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1037, 1042-44 (1972).
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organizations has been the Arc, which operates both at the national level and also
through state and local chapters. 8
Often in alliance with other disability organizations (such as local chapters of
AAMR, United Cerebral Palsy, and state Developmental Disabilities Planning
Councils), Arc volunteers became the principal lobbyists in support of state
legislation exempting people with mental retardation from the death penalty. 9 This
was particularly crucial, given their expertise concerning the nature of the disability
and the credibility they had established with legislators as a reliable, nonpartisan
source of information about the condition experienced by their sons and daughters."
Equally important was the effort's emphasis on the nature of mental retardation,
rather than the more general debate about the desirability of the death penalty.
Nowhere did the argument take the form of questioning the death penalty, or
contending that the scope of the particular state's death penalty was excessively
broad. Rather, the discussion focused on the nature of the disability that defendants
with mental retardation had, and the advocates' contention that death was a
disproportionate penalty for individuals who have lived with such limitations.
Having the terms of legislative debate center on the culpability of individuals with
mental retardation, rather than on the offenses with which they might be charged,
was essential to the success of the effort, and disability advocates had a unique
ability to maintain that focus. Given the general political unpopularity of criminal
justice proposals that favored defendants," the accomplishment of these advocates
is all the more remarkable.

28. See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS

MOVEMENT 186 (1993). The Arc's website address is http://www.thearc.org.
29. In a number of states, the efforts of disability advocates were also supported by other groups whose
principal concern was the criminal justice system or the death penalty. These included the local chapters of the
ACLU, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, state coalitions in opposition to the death penalty, and
religious organizations. But in every state, it was the disability advocates who bore the brunt of proposing and
securing enactment of the legislation.
30. But it is noteworthy that in lobbying for protection from the death penalty, Arc volunteers and other
disability advocates were not, in fact, arguing on behalf of their own family members whose condition initially
brought them into the legislative arena. The parents who had founded the Arc, and those who continued its
leadership, dedicated themselves to the work in order to better the lives of their children: to get them into public
schools, to get them decent special education, to construct quality community living facilities for them, etc. This
commitment to the improvement of the lives of their children is both selfless in its dedication to their welfare and,
at the same time, single-minded in pursuit of their individual interests. Despite the fact that none of the leaders of
the Arc in any state has a son or daughter who has faced a capital prosecution, these leaders made the enactment
of protection from the death penalty a high legislative priority. The fact that they did so, devoting to this task limited
resources and political capital to a goal that would not benefit theirchildren, reveals the moral imperative that these
leaders ascribed to the potential that any individual with mental retardation might face the possibility of a death
sentence. Indeed, for an organization that emphasizes the image of people with mental retardation as full,
responsible citizens in society, pursuing an issue that calls attention to even a small minority of disabled individuals
as criminal defendants is even more problematic.
31. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315-16:
Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting
the execution of mentally retarded persons ... provides powerful evidence that today our society
views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.
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Im1. LEGISLATURES AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The Atkins decision also illustrates the unique relationship between state
legislatures and the Supreme Court under the Eighth Amendment. At first glance,
it might seem incongruous for the Court to find an enactment of a state legislature
to be unconstitutional because of the actions of the legislatures of other states. But
while the Court, in interpreting other parts of the Constitution, occasionally observes
that a particular state's statute is unique or unusual, 32 it is only in the context of the
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment that such comparisons are given
doctrinal significance.
This unique feature of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence derives, of course, from
the text's prohibition on the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments." Having
made the judgment that the amendment does more than just outlaw those
punishments, such as drawing and quartering, that were unacceptable at the time of
its adoption,33 the Court needed a methodology for determining which punishments
have become unacceptable through the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."34
In a series of cases in recent decades, the Court has invalidated state laws,
particularly involving capital punishment, at least in part, because they represent a
practice that is no longer accepted by the nation as a whole.35 These adjudications,
which the Court has carefully circumscribed, have two practical consequences. First,
they serve a very limited modernizing function, so that the Punishments Clause is
not restricted to a mere antiquarian search for remnants (or revivals) of punishments
that had been deemed unacceptable in the late eighteenth century. Second, they offer
a modicum of nationalization,36 providing a check against isolated states that would
impose punishments that are unacceptable in other areas of the country.37
But since it is committed to limiting judicial oversight of state legislative policy
choices and concerned that its cases interpreting the Clause manifest both stability

32. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 122-23 n. 13 (1996) (procedural due process); Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 151 n.22 (1986) (dormant commerce).
33. This conclusion is consistent with the text of the Amendment. Had its framers only intended to outlaw
punishments that were unacceptable at the time, they could have employed much more specific language. The
selection of the more general language found in the Clause suggests an openness to adaptation to changing times.
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 13-14 (1980).
34. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
35. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The laws of other states also serve a much more limited function in determining
whether a non-capital punishment challenged under the Eighth Amendment is disproportionate to the offense the
defendant has committed. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); Ewing v. California, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1187 (2003) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion); id. at 1194 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
36. This modest nationalization must be understood in the context of the Court's continued emphasis on the
federalism-driven principle that states have considerable latitude in adopting and implementing their own public
policies concerning punishment for crimes. See, e.g., Ewing, 123 S.Ct. at 1187 ("Our traditional deference to
legislative policy finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution 'does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory."').
37. For example, the Court in Atkins noted that "even among those States that regularly execute offenders
and that have no prohibition with regard to the mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing a
known IQ less than 70 since we decided Penry." 536 U.S. at 316. The Court identified the states as Alabama, Texas,
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Virginia. Id. at 316 n.20. See also Coker, 433 U.S. at 595-96 (identifying Georgia
as the only state that still imposed the death penalty for rape).
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and accuracy in discerning contemporary standards, the Court has been particularly
cautious in ascertaining whether a constitutionally adequate consensus exists. As
exemplified in Penry, the Justices have resisted arguments based solely on public
opinion surveys or other evidence that does not include legislative enactments,
particularly by state legislatures.
The Court has not elaborated on all the reasons for this focus on state enactments,
but some of its features are illustrated in the Court's decisions, including Atkins.
These cases make clear that the consensus analysis under the Punishments Clause
cannot be reduced to a simplistic formula.
What function do the state enactments serve in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment? Obviously, it cannot be as a directly quantified majoritarian surrogate
for the American electorate. If that were the case, a statute enacted by Congress
(which represents the American people) to prohibit a punishment under federal law
would be sufficient to define such a penalty as violative of the Eighth Amendment,
and thus preclude its imposition by any state. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
rejected that conclusion. 8 Similarly, if the function of legislative enactments were
as direct reflections of the country's voters, the size of an enacting state's population
would certainly matter. And yet there is no suggestion in the Court's opinions that
laws passed by the representatives of voters in large states, like California or Texas,
are to be given greater weight than enactments in Wyoming or North Dakota.39 Nor
do the decisions offer any support for a conclusion that the states are being counted
as integral (and fungible) sovereigns in the federal system, which is the function
they serve in the ratification process for amendments under Article V of the
Constitution.
This seeming ambiguity of purpose became an issue in Atkins. The state of
Virginia and its supporting amici grounded their central argument on the contention
that the state enactments were insufficiently numerous. This argument was echoed
in the opinions of the three dissenting Justices.4 ° Indeed, one of the state's
supporting amici referred disparagingly to the entire enterprise as a matter of
"[c]ounting noses among the state legislatures."'" But this argument misperceived
the role of statutory enactments in ascertaining a national consensus about
punishments. The Court had never suggested that determining national sentiment
about an Eighth Amendment issue was simply a matter of tallying up the total of the
bills passed by state legislatures. There is nothing in the Court's opinions to suggest

38. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (rejecting the contention that the minimum age of
18 under the Federal death penalty was dispositive of the Eighth Amendment issue); Penry, 492 U.S. at 288
(reaching a similar conclusion regarding federal preclusion of the death penalty for defendants with mental
retardation). In addition, although the Court has not addressed it directly, it would appear that any rule establishing
congressional action alone as definitive of constitutional limitations on the states would carry implications for the
Court's approach to federalism. Cf.City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39. Another issue is the seeming inconsistency of the Court's treatment of states whose laws do not authorize
the death penalty. There was a suggestion in Stanford that the attitudes of such states were unknowable regarding
particular categories of executions, and therefore, the population of those states should be excluded categorically
from the process of ascertaining a national consensus. 492 U.S. at 370 n.2. By contrast, the Court in Atkins evaluated
public opinion in the nation as a whole. 536 U.S. at 315-16.
40. 536 U.S. 304, 340-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Justice Legal Foundation at 14, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(No. 00-8452).
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that the Justices consider the determination of a national consensus on any aspect
of capital punishment to be comparable to scorekeeping in some form of game.
None of the cases implies that there is a "target" or "magic number" of states,
attainment of which mandates Eighth Amendment relief (and short of which, relief
cannot be ordered). The cases do not describe a simplistic formula or recipe. On the
contrary, the seriousness of the Court's approach to state legislation could not be
clearer.
The Court has referred to the function of state legislation in ascertaining the
presence or absence of a national consensus: "First among the objective indicia that
reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction are statutes passed by society's
elected representatives."42 Among the attributes of legislation that commend it to the
Court as a means of measuring public opinion are the political accountability of the
members of state legislatures whose responsibility under our system is to reflect and
codify public sentiment, and their "considered judgment."4 3 It is the legislative
process that helps guide the Court's consideration. If a proposal to reduce or
mitigate a punishment has survived the legislative crucible of competing interests,
it is a clear indication that undue weight is not being attributed to a transitory or
ephemeral opinion.
This approach is fully consistent with the language the Court has employed to
describe its use of legislative enactments. In no case, has it described the state and
federal statutes as constituting the consensus. Rather, the cases discuss the statutes
as "evidence" of the consensus." The accumulation of enactments by different
legislative bodies constitutes confirmation that a claimed consensus is sufficiently
widespread and sufficiently durable to survive the process to passage in different
political climates and divergent legislative settings. Thus, Penry is properly
understood, not as a holding that there was no consensus against executing
individuals with mental retardation, but rather that with only one federal and two
state statutes enacted at the time of the Court's consideration, there was not adequate
evidence of such a consensus.
Refocusing on legislation as evidence regarding a claimed consensus, rather than
constituting the consensus itself, also explains the Court's reference to other forms
of evidence. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Atkins notes, in passing, that
the judgments of state legislators on this issue are consistent with the positions of
professional organizations, international and religious bodies, and the results of
public opinion surveys.45 These references elicited sharp criticism in the dissenting
opinions.46 But the observation that others have reached conclusions similar to those
of state and federal legislators is perfectly consistent with the Court's approach to
the Eighth Amendment. Since the statutes are viewed by the Court as evidence
concerning a consensus (rather than constituting the consensus itself), there is no
reason for the Court not to seek confirmation in other manifestations of the public's
attitudes toward a practice.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 (internal quotations omitted).
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
See, e.g., Penry, 492 U.S. at 334-35; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
536 U.S. at 315-16 n.21.
Id. at 326-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Court's approach to identifying a possible national consensus is found,
not by seeing Atkins as a departure from Penry, but by reading the cases together.
Evidence from nonlegislative sources may help confirm the existence of a
consensus, but legislative enactments are crucial and indispensablecomponents of
any such conclusion.
CONCLUSION
The course of events from Penry in 1989 to Atkins in 2002 illuminates the
Supreme Court's approach to the consensus component of Eighth Amendment
analysis and the process by which constitutional change can be accomplished.
Disability advocates, who had identified the prospect of individuals with mental
retardation facing the death penalty as morally unacceptable, took their concerns to
their state legislators. When their concerns and the force of their arguments proved
persuasive in individual legislatures, those advocates accomplished more than the
just changes they sought and obtained in the laws of their particular states. The
accumulation of their efforts helped the Court to recognize the strength and
durability of their moral arguments, and the Court properly read this as sufficient
evidence of a national consensus against imposing the death penalty on any
individual with mental retardation.

